Counterclaim Response

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Counterclaim response details

Kenneth McKee
I dispute the factual assertions and legal conclusions set forth in Alex Pagan’s counterclaim regarding ownership, non-infringement, and alleged misrepresentation. Regarding the dispute over ownership and non-infringement, Pagan claims that Humble Performance is the author and owner of the subject audiovisual works under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, and that his continued broadcast of the media was therefore lawful. This position is legally untenable. Pagan concedes that I was engaged as an independent contractor rather than an employee. Under the common-law agency analysis established by the Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, independent contractors retain full copyright ownership of their original works. Furthermore, under 17 U.S.C. § 101, commissioned audiovisual works created by an independent contractor can only qualify as a work made for hire if both parties execute an express written instrument signed by them stating as much. Pagan explicitly admits on the record that no such signed instrument exists. Because I was an independent contractor and no signed writing exists transferring my rights, initial and exclusive copyright ownership vested in me upon creation. Regarding the dispute over copyright infringement, I assert that Pagan committed actionable copyright infringement by continuing to broadcast, stream, and monetize my creative catalog without authorization. Pagan argues that he held a right to exploit these works, yet he never paid for or acquired a license. In fact, during negotiations for our August 22, 2025 separation agreement, draft provisions in Sections 2 and 3 that would have granted Pagan licensing and commercial usage rights were deliberately rejected and excised. The final executed agreement contains an integration clause in Section 7 that extinguished all prior oral, written, or implied understandings. Pagan specifically denies ever holding a license, and when I formally notified him in September 2025 that any permission to use my media was revoked, he had no contractual or statutory authority to display my content. Because copyright infringement is a continuing violation occurring with every unauthorized commercial broadcast, Pagan’s post-agreement public distribution and monetization of my registered works constituted willful copyright infringement. Pagan’s attempt to rely on Section 5 of the August 22, 2025 Agreement to argue non-infringement is similarly deficient. Section 5 is a retrospective release applying strictly to liabilities arising prior to the effective date. It contains no language conveying copyright title or granting a perpetual, royalty-free commercial license. A retrospective release of past disputes cannot serve as an advance waiver or prospective license authorizing future, continuous infringement. Finally, regarding the dispute over alleged misrepresentation, the statements in my DMCA takedown notifications did not constitute knowing or material misrepresentations under 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). To establish liability under Section 512(f), Pagan must prove actual, subjective bad faith—meaning I knew the targeted material was non-infringing at the time the notices were submitted. I held, and continue to hold, an honest, legally grounded belief that I am the sole copyright owner of these registered works, that no written instrument ever transferred my ownership, and that Pagan had neither a license nor consent to commercially monetize my catalog. My notices accurately identified unauthorized uses of my protected property to halt ongoing infringement. Because my statements were true, supported by federal law, and submitted in good faith, there was no misrepresentation under Section 512(f), and Pagan’s counterclaim should be dismissed in its entirety.
This statement addresses Alex Pagan’s counterclaim of misrepresentation under 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). To establish liability for misrepresentation, Pagan must prove that I issued DMCA takedown notifications knowing that the targeted material was non-infringing. The record establishes the opposite: I am the sole author and owner of the creative works, retained all copyrights, and Pagan never paid for or acquired a license to exploit them. First, Pagan concedes that I was engaged as an independent contractor, yet argues that Humble Performance owns the works under the work-made-for-hire doctrine because "there is no written instrument between Humble and McKee to the contrary." This argument is legally incorrect. Under 17 U.S.C. § 101, an independent contractor's audiovisual creation can only be classified as a work made for hire if both parties execute an express written agreement specifically designating it as such. In the absence of a signed writing, the independent creator remains the exclusive author and copyright owner as a matter of law. By admitting that I was an independent contractor and conceding that no signed work-for-hire instrument exists, Pagan confirms that initial and exclusive copyright ownership vested in me. Second, Pagan never paid for or obtained a license to use or broadcast these works. In fact, Pagan expressly rejected the opportunity to license them. During negotiations for our August 22, 2025 separation agreement, draft provisions in Sections 2 and 3 that would have granted Pagan licensing and usage rights were deliberately rejected and excised. The final executed contract contains a strict integration clause in Section 7, confirming that no outside, oral, or prior understandings survived. Pagan chose not to pay for a license, admits in his response that no licensing agreement exists, and possesses no legal instrument granting him display rights. Third, Pagan’s reliance on Section 5 of the August 22, 2025 Agreement is unavailing. Section 5 is a retrospective release that applies strictly to claims "arising prior to the effective date." It does not convey copyright ownership, nor does it grant Pagan a perpetual, royalty-free commercial license to broadcast my media into the future. Copyright infringement is a continuing tort, and each unauthorized post-agreement display constitutes an independent violation. When I formally notified Pagan in September 2025 that any permission to use my media was revoked, Pagan had no ongoing contractual or statutory right to continue broadcasting my catalog. A release of prior claims cannot serve as an advance waiver or prospective license for continuing, uncompensated infringement. Because I own these works, never transferred the copyrights, and Pagan never paid for or secured a license, my DMCA notifications were an accurate, good-faith assertion of ownership to halt unlicensed commercial exploitation. There was no knowing or material misrepresentation under Section 512(f), and Pagan’s counterclaim should be dismissed in its entirety.
Even if any statement in my DMCA notifications were deemed inaccurate, it was made unintentionally, in good faith, and without any knowledge of falsehood. Liability under 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) requires a showing of knowing, subjective bad faith—not an honest disagreement over legal rights. At the time I submitted the takedown requests, I genuinely believed, and continue to believe, that I am the exclusive owner of the creative works. I personally filmed, edited, and produced them. Because I was engaged as an independent contractor and no signed written instrument exists transferring ownership or designating them as works made for hire under 17 U.S.C. § 101, I had every legal reason to believe that copyright ownership remained solely with me. Furthermore, during our August 22, 2025 negotiations, Pagan specifically rejected and removed the proposed licensing provisions, leaving the final contract with an integration clause that extinguished prior understandings. Because Pagan chose not to license the works and was explicitly told that permission to display them was revoked, I honestly believed his continued broadcasting and monetization of my content was unauthorized. I did not act with any intent to deceive, mislead the platform, or misrepresent facts. My notices were submitted strictly to protect what I honestly understood to be my intellectual property. Any alleged inaccuracy was entirely unintentional and cannot support a claim for knowing misrepresentation under Section 512(f).